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A cooperative bargaining model is adapted to the setting of local government in Norway. Aggregate
consumption, the capital stock and net financial wealth in the local public sector are endogenized. The
origin of intertia in the model is ascribed to incrementalism or adjustment costs in the disagreement points
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Introduction
The local public sector in Norway has experienced a relatively high rate of growth during
most of the post-war era. The sector, which contains about 450 municipalities at the local
level and 19 counties at the intermediate level of government, accounted for 15 percent of the
mainland gross domestic product and 17 percent of total employment in 1991. The growing
portion of economic activities under the management of local public authorities, means that
the behaviour of these authorities has become more important to the macroeconomic
performance of the Norwegian economy.
The main concern of this paper is how to explain local government spending behaviour in
Norway at the aggregate level. In chapter 2, a theoretical model of local government spending
behaviour is developed. In chapter 3, the model is estimated on annual time series data from
the National Accounts of Norway for the period 1973 - 1991. The data are aggregated over
all Norwegian municipalities and counties. The variables and data definitions in the model
are summarized in Appendix A. Chapter 4 contains simulation results for the empirical
model.
In the model analysis, local government disposable income is treated as exogenous. It is
shown that disposable income is an important determinant for the dynamic spending pattern
of local governments. When income increases, there is considerable sluggishness in the
adjustment of consumption and real investment, leading to a decrease in the debt ratio in the
short and medium term. The incrementalist hypothesis that the budget in the present year
closely resembles the budget allocation in the previous year is found too simple to provide an
accurate description of spending behaviour. It is found that local goverment consumption, the
capital stock and the net debt in the long run are stabilized relative to disposable income.
Some of the benchmark models in public finance represent the economic behaviour of public
authorities as that of preference maximization for a single individual agent. However, the
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models take various views on who's preferences are guiding the policy outcome.' Either the
decision-maker is assumed to be a benevolent social planner, or it is the median voter who
controls the outcome, or the power rests with the agenda setter in the guise of an influential
chief politician or bureaucrat.
On the other hand, there are theories which introduce pluralism, conflict and bargaining in the
budgetary process. In Niskanen (1975), the relation between bureaucrats and politicians is
represented as that of a bilateral monopoly. They are mutually involved in the exchange of
some output for a budget. Van Winden (1983) develops an interest function approach which
emphasizes the influence of pressure groups and social classes on government behaviour.
Fischer and Kamlet (1984) propose a model of trade-offs among defense, non-defense, and
fiscal policy concerns as they are reflected in the US presidential budgetary process. Their
model conforms to the asymmetric Nash-solution to a tripartite game among advocates of
defense and non-defense expenditures, and guardians of fiscal restraint.
In section 2.1, cooperative bargaining theory is applied to the Norwegian institutional setting.
The model is based on a pluralist view of politics, in which conflicting interests and demands
are reconciled by means of bargaining. However, the Nash-product could also be interpreted
as the Stone-Geary utility function of a single agent. Thus, the model may represent several
views as regarding power distribution and who's preferences are guiding the policy outcome.
Even if the political process is pluralist, the extent of conflict and antagonism in budget-
making may be exaggerated. In the model presented below, considerable emphasis is laid on
the cooperative aspect of bargaining. The bulk of local government spending may actually be
undisputed. The presence of consensus, legal norms, shared social values and long range
commitments may substantially delimit the area of contention in the bargaining process. This
is assumed to affect the formation of disagreement points, which is discussed in section 2.2.
I Inman (1989), Rubinfeld (1987).
4
2. A bargaining model of local government spending
behaviour
2.1 The asymmetric Nash bargaining model
This section develops a model of consumption, investment and budget surplus in a
representative local government. The model presented is inspired by Fisher and Kamlet
(1984) and Hagen and Sorensen (1993). However, the formulation adopted here differs
especially in two respects:
• Total spending is split into consumption and investment expenditures
• Local government debt is explicitly incorporated in the model
The axioms of the original Nash (1950) model are essentially normative. Harsanyi (1977) and
Binmore et al (1986) provide arguments in support of it's relevance in positive modelling. It
has become customary to disregard the symmetry axiom in order to allow for unequal
distribution of power among agents. 2
 Although the outcome is Pareto optimal to the agents
involved, it is not necessarily socially optimal.
The budgetary discretion of local governments in Norway is severely restricted. The national
government determines the grants, and the local income tax rates are constrained by an upper
limit. All authorities adopt the upper limit tax rate. Property taxes are hardly important, and
what remains is about .10 percent of local revenues made up by charges that are regulated by
law. Before 1981, prices charged for local services were subject to central regulation. In
1981, the price regulation regime was replaced by a provision that the fee income cannot
exceed the costs of providing the service. Thus, the opportunities of local governments to
increase revenues by imposing a higher tax rate on the residents, are limited. As a reasonable
approximation, we assume that revenues are exogenous.
2
 Roth (1979).
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Qa
Like in numerous other countries, local governments in Norway face a balanced budget law.
The Local Government Act requires current expenditures to be covered by revenues.
Borrowing is only allowed when issued to finance physical capital investment projects. Due
to the widespread application of balanced budget laws, it is customary in empirical analysis to
assume that the budget must balance in every period. Contrary to this, Leonard (1986) has
emphasized that these laws require only that a balanced budget be submitted prior to the fiscal
year, not that spending actually adhere to the budget. Because most balance rules require
equating an estimate of revenues with an estimate of expenditures, there is considerable slack
in the budget balance requirement. In short, local governments can and do circumvent
balanced budget rules. 3
The budget constraint relevant to a local authority in period t is
n	 n
PitG ±y, Qii. AK + AW, = Y,
i=1	 i=i
(2.1)
Local government nominal disposable income
Real consumption item i
Net real investment item i
Local government budget surplus
Price per unit of consumption item i
Price per unit of net real investment item i
is the real capital stock on item i, so AK-i, is net real investment. Depreciation is included
in consumption Gi„ in accordance with the definition in the National Accounts.
Equation (2.1) divides the budget by item and by spending for consumption and investment
purposes. One can conceive of the items as n specific departments, agencies or programmes
3 Holtz-Eakin et al (1993).
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that constitute a complete partition of the budget. The difference between revenues and
expenditures is reflected in the budget surplus.
Since revenues and prices will be regarded as exogenous, what is left to the discretion of the
budget-makers is real consumption and capital spending partitioned by item - and the budget
surplus. Each of these 2n + 1 terms is politically or economically significant in its own right.
All of the consumption and investment items are advocated by at least one influencial
politician, bureaucrat or interest group. Otherwise it would not be on the budget. However,
the distinction between consumption and investment agents should not be taken too literally.
A single agent may fancy both high consumption and investment spending for a particular
sector. But given a sector budget, there are conflicts over appropriations for current
expenditures as opposed to capital outlays.
On the other hand, there must be some guardian of the budget deficit, to keep checks on the
public debt. As discussed above, local governments are legally committed to balance the
budget. But this may not suffice to prevent the debt from exploding. For that, the budget-
makers have to carry the intention of some degree of compliance with the law. The Chief
Administrative Manager is liable to be such a proponent of budgetary discipline and restraint.
Yet, the model does not preclude that all agents have a common interest in keeping the public
debt under control.
Now consider the bargain between advocates of grants for various purposes, and guardians of
budgetary restraint. The asymmetric Nash-product pertaining to this bargaining problem at
time t is given by
n
N1 =
 4 (F (Git _G:))7i ( AKit — AK": )) Ki (A W, W,d )O)i=1 (2.2)
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The symbols with top-mark d signify the respective disagreement points or minimum
requirement levels of the advocates and guardians. For the moment, it is sufficient to assume
that the disagreement points are exogenous. The y i , x i , and 03 coefficients are to be
interpreted as measures of the relative power supporting the conflicting claims on behalf of
the budget. The Nash-product (2.2) is maximized with respect to the endogenous variables,
and subject to the budget constraint (2.1). The derived first-order conditions are
P (G —Gd )=  a	 a	 ll 
W, — A W, d
i = (1,2,...n)	 (2.3)
Q. (AK — AK.1 )K = 	it	 it 
 CO	 i = (1,2,...n)	 (2.4)Awt _ Awtd
Together with the budget constraint, this yields 2n +1 equations to determine the endogenous
variables Git , AKit and AVVt . The division into n budgetary items is redundant for our
purpose, which is to explain consumption and capital spending at the aggregate level.
Therefore, consider the following definitions:
n
Pit Gis =
n
Pit G = G td
1=1
n
Qit A K it = QtAlc,
i=i
n
Qtt AK- idt = Qt AKtd
n
IYi =1i=i
(2.5)
(2.6)
(2.7)
(2.8)
(2.9)
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n1 1C = 1C	 (2.10)
i=1
Total local government consumption
AKt Total local government net real investment
Pt	 Local government consumption price index
Qt	 Local government net real investment price index
Total consumption and investment is derived by summation over the n items that constitute
the budget. The aggregate disagreement points are correspondingly defined by summing up
the itemized disagreement points. The aggregate power coefficients for consumption and
investment purposes are the sum of itemized power coefficients.
Summing equations (2.3), (2.4) and (2.1) over i, and utilizing (2.5) - (2.10), yields the
aggregate first-order conditions
F;(Gt —Gtd )
7=	 dc°AW,—AWt
= 
Qt (AKt — AKtd ) co
Awt _ Awt d
(2.11)
(2.12)
Pt Gt +Qt AlCt + AWt
	(2.13)
(2.11) - (2.13) give 3 equations to determine the endogenous variables Gt , AKt and AVy . It is
obvious that only the proportional magnitudes of the power coefficients are of significance, so
that the following restriction can be imposed without loss of generality:
y-F1c+o)=1	 (2.14)
9
(2.14) contains the appealing property that total power in the budgetary process equals unity.
Combined with the first-order conditions, this renders the reduced form equations
= 
Pt (Gt — Gtd )
BS,
K= Qt (AK, —AK')
BS,
AW AWdt 
BS,
BS, = Yt — Pt Gtd — Qt AKtd — AW,d
(2.15)
(2.16)
(2.17)
(2.18)
BS, is the budget slack, or what is left over when the minimum requirements are satisfied.
The budget slack constitutes the disputed amount of funds, or the area of contention in the
local government budget allocation.
The powerfulness of a specific demand for funds, as measured by the power coefficients,
determines the proportion of the budget slack which is appropriated for that purpose.
The reduced form model (2.15) - (2.18) is assumed to be valid even in the case when the
budget slack is negative. Then, there is a shortfall which is divided among purposes in
proportions determined by the power coefficients.
2.2 The disagreement points
In section 2.1, it was assumed that the disagreement points are given, or exogenous. As the
disagreement points are unobservables, some additional assumptions are needed to make the
model operational. In this section, the disagreement points are endogenized. When the
disagreement points are endogenous, one will have to substitute for the disagreement points in
equation (2.15) - (2.18) in order to derive the reduced form model.
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The minimum requirement levels should be thought of as critical values which become focal
points in bargaining for some strategic or normative reason. A commonly held view is that
the disagreement points coincide with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Yet, in our
model it is not so clear what the non-cooperative solution would be. And so, it is reasonable
to draw more attention to the role played by legal norms and social values shared among the
agents. The minimum requirements could in this perspective be called points of agreement,
rather than disagreement, but we will stick to the conventional terminology.
One possible norm which can impinge upon the disagreement points, is that of
incrementalism, or preservation of the status quo. Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky (1966)
point out that
budgets are almost never actively reviewed as a whole in the sense of considering at once the value of all
existing programs as compared to all possible alternatives. Instead, this year's budget is based on last year's
budget, with special attention given to a narrow range of increases or decreases.
Under pure incrementalism, the instructive function of a would-be ideal state of the budget is
displaced by the gravitational force of the present state of the budget. Preservation of the
status quo tends to be elevated into a normative principle, almost like a property right. In the
case of pure incrementalism, budget-makers follow simple decision-rules, like keeping
constant the expected real expenditures of an agency.
This method of action could derive from bounded rationality among decision-makers, but may
also be consistent with rational behaviour. First, high transaction and adjustment costs may
make it too costly to scrutinize the whole budget allocation in every year. Second,
preservation of the status quo may be in the interests of powerful interest groups.
An objection to the pure incrementalist model is that in the long run, straightforward
preservation of the status quo may give rise to vast inefficiencies, unjustness or sub-optimal
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allocations as the environment is changing. In the short run, incrementalism may be quite
decisive to the budget allocation, but in the long run, we expect that adaptations are made to a
changing economic environment.
There are other hypotheses at hand than the incrementalist one. With zero-base threatpoints,
the budget slack comprises the whole budget, so that the whole allocation is reconsidered in
every bargain. It is shown below that the zero-base model does not explain inertia in the
spending behaviour. Furthermore, the model does not take into account all the constraints
which delimit the local government decision set.
Centrally imposed minimum standards, received selective grants, mandatory programmes and
long-range commitments easily become focal points when deciding upon local spending.
However, these constraints are not expected to be temporary stable either in real terms or as
budget shares. In 1980 and 1986, there were reforms in the grant system of the central
government, going from selective grants to more general grants. Minimum standards and
other commitments may change. Even though minimum standards may be important
constraints in quite a few local public service producing sectors; like day care centres,
education, health care and care for the elderly, it is hard to measure in monetary terms the use
of recources required to fullfil the standards. We have no access to time-series data which can
quantify minimum requirements for consumption and real investment at the aggregate level
on the basis of observed selective grants and minimum standards in specific local public
services. The central authorities lay down minimum standards in order to regulate local
priorities across service producing sectors. The standards may be less relevant to an
explanation of consumption and capital spending at the aggregate level.
We will now formalize some of the possible assumptions concerning the disagreement points,
and substitute for the alternative formulations in the bargaining model (2.15) - (2.18).
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Model A: Pure incrementalism
The incremental hypothesis asserts that the status quo is by far the most important alternative
to which reallocations are compared. To preserve the status quo, the requirement for
consumption is
Gtd = Gt_ i 	(2.19.A)
Real and financial investments are equal to changes in stock variables. Preservation of the
status quo may be interpreted as zero change in the stock variable. Then, for investment
expenditures and the budget surplus we have
(2.20.A)
(2.21.A)
(2.21.A) may also be derived from the quest for balanced budgets in the Local Government
Act. After substituting the disagreement points (2.19.A) - (2.21.A) in equations (2.15) -
(2.18), we get
Pt AGt = y (1 1 Gt-  )
Yt	 Yt
Q, AK,
	P G 
= Ko 	 )
171	 Yt
AW PGt = 03(1
	t t-i 
Yt	 Yt
(2.22.A)
(2.23.A)
(2.24.A)
The incrementalist budget slack comprises current income minus the consumption of the last
period measured in current prices.
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Model B: Zero-base threatpoints
The zero-base hypothesis accentuate that grants can become no less than zero, and that the
corner solution naturally form a focal point in bargaining. Hagen and Sorensen (1993)
conclude that a zero-base empirical model is preferable to a model with incrementalist
disagreement points. However, in our setting the zero-base notion should be interpreted
carefully. In the National Accounts, consumption is defined as non-charged current
expenditures plus depreciation. The depreciation component is largely predetermined, and is
obviously positive. Thus, the zero-base consumption threatpoint becomes
Pt Gtd = Vt Dt 	(2.19.B)
Dt 	Depreciation in real terms
Vt	 Price per unit of depreciation
The zero-base real investment threatpoint is accordingly defined as zero gross investment
QtAKtd .—vtpt 	(2.20.B)
As borrowing for current expenditures is illegal, the budget deficit has to be smaller than
gross real investment. Letting this provision determine the zero-base minimum required
budget surplus, we get
AW,d =—Qt AKt —V,Dt 	(2.21.B)
The solution to the model (2.15) - (2.18) combined with (2.19.B) - (2.21.B) is
PG—VDI
. 	y 	 (2.22.B)
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1— K
Qt AlCi -FV,D,	 K
Y;
(2.23.B)
6,141,	 K
	=-0) (1 (1)) 	
Y1	 1-K
(2.24.13)
The zero-base budget slack comprises disposable income plus gross investment. When the
power coefficients are constant, the zero-base model implies that the budget shares of current
expenditures, gross investment and the budget surplus are kept constant. The fact that local
governments have significant aggregated net debt may indicate a relatively small value of w.
Constant budget shares may result from optimising or satisficing behaviour in the face of
technological constraints which limit the scope for factor substitution in the production of
public services. Resources are allocated in fixed proportions to the factors of production in
order to maintain a satisfying factor input mix. When agents worry about efficiency, this may
be reflected in the power coefficients y and K. On the other hand, to measures the influence
of the debt aversion motive.
Model C: Social optimizing with adjustment costs
An objection to model B is that all real magnitudes are adjusted instantaneously to changes in
income and prices. There is no scope for inertia and adjustment costs. This is in conflict with
the serious sluggishness of adjustment documented in a study of local government behaviour
in Norway by Borge and ILAN?) (1993). One may also suspect that the dynamic specification
of the pure incrementalist model is too simple and restrictive. Model C is designed to
encompass several types of dynamic responses to changes in the economic environment.
Assume that local government decision-makers hold some common beliefs on the relationship
between budget shares which is considered to be efficient or fair. To define the ideal
propensity to consume in period t, they use the rule
15
g(( Pt Gt
  )*). 
	
,Wt  (k)e , (YL)e rte
Yt	 Pt	 Pt
(2.25)
Equation (2.25) is specified to include non-linear functional forms. The ideal rate of
consumption is a function of lagged depreciation and net financial wealth in proportion to
disposable income. The ideal rate also depends on expected relative prices. We use the term
social optimizing even though the ideal consumption budget share need not be efficient or fair
by a certain set of objective criteria.
Inclusion of lagged budget shares may derive from incomplete information and adaptive
behaviour. When the lagged depreciation budget share is high, the ideal consumption budget
share is high, ceteris paribus. When the expected depreciation is relatively high, a high rate of
consumption is required to attain a normal budget share for current expenditures. Moreover, a
high depreciation budget share implies that the capital stock is higher than intended, so that
net real investment and saving should be low relative to income. When the lagged debt
budget share is low, the ideal consumption budget share is high, ceteris paribus. Saving is
low, since the debt-share is allowed to increase. Relative prices are included to capture
substitution effects in budget shares.
In (2.25) there are some inertia due to adaptively formed expectations. Incrementalism and
costs of adjustment are additional sources of sluggish adjustment towards the ideal budget
share. Taking account of this, the optimal consumption budget share is
(2.26)PG **	 (.; ) 	 It_. (1 la) 	 Pt.A Gt.A 	'PG
Yt i';
k yg-1 skk yt »
It is assumed that the first derivative of g(-) is positive. We consider two main cases covered
by equation (2.26): 0 = 0, which is interpreted as the incrementalist case. And t3 > 0, which
is interpreted as the partial adjustment case.
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When O = 0, pure incrementalism follows as the special case where t = 1. On the other
extreme, p. = 0 can be labelled incrementalism with respect to budget share, as it is the
consumption budget share, and not real consumption, which is kept konstant. For 0 < ji <1
the optimal budget share is a compromise between pure incrementalism and budget share
incrementalism.
> 0 covers the case with partial adjustment towards the efficient or fair consumption budget
share. If t = 0, (2.25) and (2.26) constitute an error correction model for the consumption
budget share. If 0 < , the optimal budget share can be regarded as a compromise
between the status quo for real consumption and the efficient or fair budget share.
The consumption disagreement point is assumed to be determined by the optimal
consumption budet share.
Piqd
Yt 
(2.19.C)
Dynamic mechanisms analogous to (2.26) can be specified for real and financial investments.
To illustrate our main points, it is not necessary to elaborate any further on this. Substituting
from (2.25), (2.26) and (2.19.C) in (2.15) - (2.18) gives
.	 (1 (1 y)) 	 + 0 y)(1 ti) 	PAGt 7	 1-0	 yt
Yt-1Yt
7)0[g(
	
P G
	 )] [ QI
 AK td  + A Wy td 
-1
(2.22.C)
i;]+ (1
	 t	 t
Yt
Qt AKt 
	
PG
	to  Pt_iG, 	ixe
P
_ Ke[g(  t-1 G,	 Awdh()]	 t 
};-1 	 i';
(2.23.C)
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LW1
	P	 q_
	 =	 0)[ii,  G" -- i	 p.t) P 	]-F (1 co) AWi d
Yt	 )7/	 Yi-1	 Y,
—coO[ P,Gg( 	 ") h()] 0) Q,AlCid 
Y,
(2.24.C)
In order to arrive at the full-fledged reduced form model, one will also have to substitute for
the real and financial investment disagreement points.
For O = 0, the consumption disagreement point is determined by incrementalism. For O > 0,
the model postulates an optimal budget share allocation which is agreed upon as the best long-
run solution, and this is reflected in the consumption disagreement point. In this case, the
optimal allocation is derived on the basis of incomplete information, so the disagreement
point is formed ex ante. Inertia stem from adaptive expectations and adjustment costs. Given
the disagreement points, and given realizations of stochastic exogenous variables like
disposable income and prices, the final allocation is determined ex post by appropriating the
budget slack for competing purposes according to the power parameters. The budgetary
process is modelled in two steps. In the first step, appropriations are determined by local
government long range commitments and norms of optimal management. In the second step,
the remaining slack resources are made subject to a political bargain.
3. Estimation procedure and results
In this chapter, stochastic counterparts of the three models derived in chapter 2 are estimated.
The estimation method is ordinary least squares on the suggested reduced form equations for
consumption and real investment. For the system to fulfil the budget constraint (2.13), the
budget surplus is assigned to be a residual variable. By taking ordinary least squares, we
obtain consistent estimators of the suggested reduced form equations, provided that all
relevant explanatory factors are included in the model, the functional and dynamic
specification is correct, and current income and prices are exogenous.
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The exogeneity assumption for disposable income may be violated if the policy rule of the
central government aims at stabilizing the local public economy or the aggregate activity
level. But the presence of a policy rule for central government grants, will not necessarily
bring about simultaneity bias. If the central government policy rule is backward-looking, or
adaptive, and the error term in the policy rule equation is uncoffelated with the stochastic
error terms of the estimated equations, there is no simultaneous equation bias resulting from
having current disposable income as regressor. For instance, the central government policy
rule could be formulated to stabilize the aggregate local government debt share. A relatively
high debt share will trigger high increases in central grants. But the central government
observes the local government debt share with a time lag. To the degree that the debt share is
autocorrelated, it might be reasonable to formulate an adaptive policy rule. Similar adaptive
rules could be employed if the goal is to stabilize local government real disposable income or
aggregated employment. If so, a recession in the private sector economy producing low local
tax income in the last period, brings about high central grants in the present period.
Another possible source of simultaneity bias, occurs if increases in the local public activity
level affect the private sector activity level positively, and thereby induce higher local tax
income. As before, if the effect is delayed, no bias will occur. However, if there is a positive
simultaneous feedback mechanism in income, the income impact multipliers in the
econometric equations for local government consumption and investment expenditures, will
be biased upwards. In general then, when inertia is high, as reported in Borge and Ratts0
(1993), simultaneity bias in the income impact multipliers is probably not a serious problem,
unless the central government pursue a forward-looking policy rule. A simultaneous counter-
cyclical policy will contribute to a downward bias in the impact multiplier estimates, implying
that the sluggishness is overrated. As there is some obscurity in the exogeneity assumption
for disposable income, it will be tested using the Hausman test.
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In order to make the models stochastic, the structural equations (2.11) and (2.12) are
augmented with error terms. The structural equations are transformed so that the random
disturbances are denominated as budget shares.
P(G —G d ) AVVi —AWt d0.3  t	 t	 t 
	 =E
lt
Yt	 Yt
Q( 1 —AKtd )	 AVV, —AW, d
I,; Yt	
—02t
If the error terms e l, and E 2t are zero, (3.1) and (3.2) are equivalent to the deterministic
equations (2.11) and (2.12). Solving the stochastic system of equations (3.1), (3.2) and (2.13),
we arrive at the model
P,(G,—G,d ) _ BS,
y	 — Y --y— + u lt
Qt (AKt AKtd )	 BS,K
-+u2t
Yt	 Yt
AW,— AW, d 	BS,
=0)—y -Fu3y  t
One may substitute any set of suggested disagreement point equations in (2.18) and (3.3) -
(3.5), and derive the corresponding reduced form model. The reduced form stochastic
disturbances are
Ult = (1— Y)E1t — YE2t 
	
(3.6)
I42t = 
—Ke l , + (1 — ic)E 2 ,	 (3.7)
(3.1)
(3.2)
(3.3)
(3.4)
(3.5)
20
U3r --7" -81r 82t
	 (3.8)
Due to the budget constraint, the reduced form error terms satisfy E i ui, = O.
In addition, or as an alternative, stochastic error terms can be introduced in the disagreement
point equations. Provided that all the error terms are specified in the scale of budget shares, it
follows that the error terms in the reduced form equations are white noise, if we assume that
all the error terms in the structural model are white noise.
Instability in the parameters of the model may result from institutional and political shocks
altering the distribution of power or the mechanisms guiding minimum aspiration levels
formation. Possible relief is gained from inclusion of dummy variables accounting for
perceived institutional shifts. In 1981, the central regulation of prices charged for local
services was lifted, and there has been a subsequent increase in charges. This development
might have had a crowding out effect on local government consumption, as consumption by
definition does not comprise the part of current expenditures for which clients pay charges. In
1985, there was a deregulation of credit markets which could have affected the behaviour of
local governments. The effect from deregulation, if any, is expected to be increased
borrowing, especially for real investment purposes, since borrowing for current expenditures
is prohibited in the Local Government Act.
3.1 Data considerations
The data needed for empirical modelling are mainly available in the National Accounts of
Norway. There, nominal disposable income equals tax income plus net transfers from the
central government plus net interest income minus subsidies and transfers to the private sector
minus dividend payments in local government enterprices. We assume that all the
components are exogenous. The tax income, transfers, subsidies and dividends are partly
determined by the central government, and partly by the state of the private sector economy.
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Net interest income is affected by the interest rate, and local government assets and liabilities
which are largely predetermined.
Fee income is not included in disposable income. Correspondingly, charges are substracted
from current expenditures on the left hand side of equation (2.13). Consumption equals
current expenditures plus depreciation minus fees and charges. By excluding charges from
the income definition, there is one less source of simultaneity bias when income is used as
regressor. On the other hand, if charges are endogenous, the suggested reduced form model
may be incomplete, as ommited variable biases may occur. The increase in fees and charges
during the 1980s was probably occasioned by the deregulation of fee tax rates in 1981. The
potential crowding out effect on consumption as defined in the National Accounts, will in our
model be captured only crudely by dummy variables. The same holds true for the other
institutional shifts in the sample period.
There are some shortcomings in the assets and capital stock data in the National Accounts.
For real capital, primary statistics is only available for the real investment flow, and the stock
data are derived on the basis of economic life projections and some other special assumptions.
For net financial wealth, the accounting time series show an irregular pattern before 1980,
possibly because of changes in statistical definitions. 4 Therefore, the wealth data before 1980
are derived from accounting data for net financial investments. Starting with the level of
financial debt in 1980, the debt is projected backwards by adding the budget surplus to the
debt of the subsequent year. The method assumes no valuation changes, and zero net
purchases of real estate.
Local governments possess a third type of wealth objects - real estate - which was bypassed in
the model of chapter 2. Unfortunately, real property values are missing in the National
Accounts. With an exception for Oslo from 1986 onwards, data are also missing for net
purchases of real estate, and the change in real property assets. These transactions are
4 NOS: Public sector finances 1972-1985.
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included in the residual of the circular flow relationship for local governments in the National
Accounts. On the assumption that the net purchases of real estate in the 1970s were zero, the
residual equals net financial investments, and our method of backward projection of the net
debt is valid.
Ideally, the model should endogenize real estate together with consumption, financial wealth
and the capital stock. A generalization along these lines suggests that the lagged real estate to
income ratio may enter into partial adjustment relationships in the reduced form equations for
consumption and net real investment. The lack of data may involve estimation biases due to
omission of the real estate variable. However, real property effects need not at all be
significant in the equations for consumption and net real investment. For instance, this may
be the case if there is a strong element of incrementalism in the disagreement point for net
purchases of real estate, and the power coefficient for such purchases is close to zero.
The accounting relationship for which we have data is
P,G, Q,AK, + F, + S, = Y,	 (3.9)
Ft	 Net purchases of real estate in Oslo. Assumed to be zero before 1986.
St 	Residual in the equation. Equals net financial investment plus net purchases of real
estate, except for property purchases in Oslo from 1986 onwards.
Equation (2.13) is replaced by (3.9) in the empirical mode1. 5
5 Ft
 is approximately zero in all years, except in 1986, when it was negative and amounted to almost 1 percent
of disposable income in absolute value. Ascribing this to special circumstances, the property purchases in Oslo
will be treated as exogenous in the model, while the residual St is endogenous.
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To measure the real value of disposable income, wealth, interest expenses et cetera, an overall
price index for local government expenditures is constructed. The index is a weighed average
of consumption and investment prices.
TP; = F,F; + (1 —1", )Q, G= 	
Gt + AK,
(3.10)
3.3 Econometric modelling
Estimation of equations (2.22.B) and (2.23.B) augmented with stochastic error terms shows
that the zero-base model is misspecified. The Durbin-Watson statistics in the equations are
0.42 and 0.18, respectively, and the multiple correlation coefficients are low. The static zero-
base model leaves no scope for sluggish adjustment in response of exogenous shocks. The
poor empirical performance of the model may indicate that some inertia are present, either
because of incrementalism or adjustment costs.
The incrementalist model is a special case of model C in section 2.2. To avoid
misspecification, we will adopt the methodology of David F. Hendry,6 which prescribes that
one should start with a general model specification, and then simplify the model by means of
empirical testing.
The point of departure is generalized, stochastic versions of equations (2.22.C) and (2.23.C).
Lagged change in the capital stock is included in the disagreement point for net real
investment. The disagreement points may also depend on the change in real disposable
income. Finally, changes in relative prices are included to capture substitution effects in the
short and medium run.
6 Introductions to the methodology are provided by Gilbert (1986), Hendry et al (1984) and Pagan (1987).
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When the model is augmented with differenced variables, the functional form for these
variables is designed to obtain an elasticity interpretation of the related parameters. To
achieve this, define
(3.11)
B = Qt Kt-1
Yt
(3.12)
For a variable Zt , the differentiation takes the form At A log zi in the consumption equation,
and the related parameter is interpreted as an elasticity of G, with respect to Z, . In the real
investment equation, the differentiation form is Bt A log Z„ and the related parameter is
interpreted as an elasticity of Kt with respect to 4. To simplify notation, we write zt = log Z.
In general, let the log of a variable with upper-case letters be denoted with lower-case letters.
We first turn to the econometric modelling of local government consumption. Referring to
equation (2.25), estimations of the consumption equation show that the parameters for the
lagged depreciation budget share and the lagged debt ratio are significant. In the long run, the
consumption budget share is not affected by changes in relative prices. Nevertheless, when
relative prices change, the derived model indicate that some substitution occurs in the medium
run.
The presence of significant depreciation and wealth effects imply that another mechanism
than straightforward preservation of the status quo is operative in the formation of
disagreement points. This is the partial adjustment mechanism which is introduced by the
specification in (2.22.C) for
 ø > 0 and
 y <1.
The estimate of the parameter for A, is significantly greater than zero and less than one in
absolute value. This implies that 'If <1 , g. > 0 , and y > 0 or lit < 1. The lagged consumption
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budget share has a significant negative effect, and the preferred functional form is log-linear.
The linear term is consequently omitted, and we proceed on the assumption that ji =1 and
> O.
To test for a possible crowding out effect on consumption from the rapid growth in fees and
charges in the 1980s, the lagged ratio between fees and disposable income was included in the
model. The parameter estimate was insignificant, indicating that there is no crowding out
effect in the long run.
The parameter estimate for the the first difference of real disposable income in period t is
insignificant. A lagged effect from change in real disposable income is included in the model,
although it is barely significant.
After simplification, the preferred consumption equation takes the form
P,AGt
	 a l + a2 At
 (Aqt_ i
 —	
— oc3itt (Avt-1 APt_1) cc4 A,	 —
[— asAt — a6 (P -i- gt_1 — yt_1 ) — ( v1_1 -f- d — y,_1) — f(
w
")
]
Yt_i
Yt (3.13)
where
eYs-1
	Wt-1f( Wt-1 )= log	 w =	 —log(1+ ev
1 +e ,
(3.14)
The chosen functional form is found to outperform a linear specification. The long run
relationship is log-linear in the consumption and depreciation budget shares. The log-form is
not tenable for the debt ratio, since the net debt in principle can become both positive and
negative. The functional form in (3.14) gives a lower regression standard error and a more
well-behaved equation than the linear form. The log transformation is applied to a logistic
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function of the debt ratio, which is strictly positive with 1 and 0 as upper and lower
asymptotes. f( •) is increasing and concave in the net wealth to disposable income ratio, and
is defined over all real-valued numbers. Neihter the long-run elasticity of the depreciation
budget share nor the long-run quasi-elasticity of the net wealth to income ratio on the rate of
consumption, differ significantly from 1, so these restrictions are imposed on the model.
Table 3.1 Preferred estimated consumption equation (3.13)
Estimation method: OLS	 Period: 1973 - 1991
Parameter	 Estimate	 Standard-error	 T-statistic
a l 	1.31	 0.14	 9.17
a2 	0.75	 0.11	 6.64
a3 	0.38	 0.08	 4.60
a4	 0.06	 0.04	 1.53
as 	0.26	 0.02	 11.82
a6	 0.27	 0.04	 7.34
(1=0.0044	 DW=2.30	 NORM x (2)=0.85 RESET F(1,12)=0.56
LM F(1,12)=0.55	 LM F(2,11)=0.58	 LM F(4,9)=1.77	 ARCH F(1,11)=0.06
All parameters in equation (3.13) are positively signed. Conditional on the assumption t =1,
the power parameter is identified as y = a5 . And the adjustment speed parameter is identified
as
9= a6
- a5
(3.15)
Estimation results for equation (3.13) are reported in table 3.1. The estimate of the
consumption power parameter suggests that 26 percent of the budget slack is appropriated for
consumption. The speed of adjustment towards the desired allocation is estimated to be 0.37,
meaning that 37 percent of the deviation from the last period's ideal consumption ratio is
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corrected for in the present period consumption minimum requirement. There is severe
sluggishness in the adjustment.
The effect through the coefficient a4
 contributes to reinforce the inertia in the adjustment to
increases in real disposable income. To calculate the dynamic multipliers, one also have to
take into account effects from the level terms of the model. However, the effect implies that
the budget slack is larger when real disposable income is growing than when it is not, ceteris
paribus.
We now turn to the econometric modelling of local government net real investment. Probably
because of multicollinearity between A, and the lagged consumption budget share, we were
not able to derive a precise estimate of It in the investment equation. 2.23.0 shows that the
restriction pt = 1 excludes the lagged consumption budget share from the real investment
equation. This restriction is not rejected by the data, and does not contradict the estimated
consumption equation, so it has been imposed on the empirical model.
The lagged depreciation budget share effect is significantly negative in the investment
equation. Hence, real investment is adjusted in order to stabilize the capital stock relative to
income. A high capital stock induces low investment, and a low capital stock induces high
investment.
A debt ratio effect is not significant in the investment equation. Real investment is not
adjusted to stabilize the debt ratio in the long run. The dissimilarity of the consumption and
investment equation in this respect may reflect that borrowing for real investment is not
restricted in the Local Government Act, while borrowing for current expenditures is
prohibited. It is legitimate to accumulate debt if at the same time the capital stock is piled up
proportionately. The local government debt burden does not interfer directly with the use of
real investment for long run stabilization of the capital stock.
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As in the consumption equation, there are no long run substitution effects from changes in
relative prices, but some substitution occurs in the short and medium term when relative
prices change.
The preferred net real investment equation is
Q,AK, 
Y,
Í 1	2 	— Apt )+ E3 3 A(Aq"— 41-i) — Bt(AYt —Ali;)
--05B,(4_1-AT1_1)+BrAkt_i — 06(4+ Bt Akt _ 1 ) - 07(v11+ 611 1 — yt_ 1 )
(3.16)
Table 3.2 Preferred estimated real investment equation (3.16)
Estimation method: OLS Period: 1973 - 1991
Parameter	 Estimate	 Standard-error	 T-statistic
13 1	 0.19
	
0.15
	
1.31
13 2	 0.05
	
0.02
	
2.29
P3	 0.06
	
0.02
	
2.63
04	 0.09
	 0.02	 5.46
135	 0.09
	
0.02
	
4.17
P6	 0.45
	
0.06
	
6.98
137	 0.09
	
0.04
	
2.24
a=0.0061	 DW=2.17
	 NORM x (2)=3.01 RESET F(1,11)=0.12
LM F(1,11)=0.63
	 LM F(2,10)=0.37	 LM F(4,8)=0.30	 ARCH F(1,10)=0.30
All parameters in equation (3.16) are positively signed. When the assumption	 1 is
adopted, the power parameter is identified as x = f36 . A test for the coefficient for lagged
capital stock change in the net real investment disagreement point, shows that the coefficient
does not differ significantly from 1. The null hypothesis for the test is that the coefficient for
lagged capital stock growth in the reduced form real investment equation equals 1— lc =1— 0 6 .
The test statistic for the restriction is F(1,11)=2.17, and it is imposed on the model
formulation. The result may be interpreted as an element of incrementalism in the real
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investment disagreement point tied to the investment flow, and not to the capital stock as in
equation (2.20.A).
The positive sign of P3 may indicate that high inflation in investment prices either induces
provisional postponement of projects or transfers of expenses to the next year budget.
Estimation results for equation (3.16) are reported in table 3.2. The estimate for f) 6 is
significantly positive. According to the estimate, 45 percent of the budget slack is
appropriated for net real investment. This is high, considering that the real investment budget
share is low compared to that of consumption.
The effects through the coefficients P4 and 135 contribute to reinforce the inertia in the
adjustment to increases in real disposable income. To calculate the dynamic multipliers, one
also have to take into account effects from the level terms of the model. However, the effects
imply that the budget slack is larger when real disposable income is growing than when it is
not, ceteris paribus.
Having determined consumption and real investment in equations (3.13) and (3.16), financial
investments plus real estate purchases follow residually from the budget constraint (3.9).
Using the estimated equations and equation (2.14), an estimate of the budget surplus power
parameter is available. The estimate is co =1 -- lc =1— a5 — f3 6 = 0.29.
None of the reported misspecification tests for the two estimated equations are significant at
the 5 percent level. That is, the two equations are not rejected because of autocorrelation,
heteroscedasticity or non-normality in the residuals, or incorrect functional form.
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Recursive parameter estimates and standard deviations are shown graphically in Appendix C. 7
Except for the moderate instability in some of the consumption equation parameters before
1983, and in P6 in1985, all the parameters of the model are seen to be quite stable throughout.
It may appear that the reforms of the 1980s did not give rise to major structural shifts at the
macro level.
The exogeneity assumption for disposable income has been inspected with the aid of
Hausman (1978) tests. The first step is to estimate a reduced form model for nominal
disposable income. To avoid any simultaneity bias, only lagged variables are included among
the regressors. The regressors are the lagged first differences of local government financial
wealth, the overall price index for local government expenditures, the interest rate on
housholds liabilities in private financial institutions, private consumption, mainland gross
domestic product, aggregate unemployment and a constant term. Equations (3.13) and (3.16)
are augmented with the regressor formed by the residuals from the estimated equation for
disposable income. The null hypothesis is that the related coefficient is equal to zero. If the
residuals from the estimated equation for disposable income are correlated with the residuals
in equations (3.13) or (3.16), the exogeneity assumption for disposable income is impaired,
and the least squares estimators are invalidated due to inconsistency. The t-statistics are 0.85
and 0.28 in the consumption and real investment equation, respectively. Thus, the null
hypothesis is not rejected, and the exogeneity assumption can be retained.
4. Model simulations
The next task to be undertaken is an integration of the estimated equations of chapter 3 with
some definitional relationships, to obtain a complete model of local government spending
behaviour. The dynamic effects of exogenous shocks to the model are then simulated.
7
 Recursive estimates show the time path of the estimates when the period of estimation is changed. Instability
reduces the confidence in the ability of the model to predict the data.
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To start with, some of the previously stated equations are reiterated. The econometric
equations are
PGt
Yt
al + a2 4 04_ 1 - ARA
 - a3At (Avt, - Apt_, - At
 (41_1 - ATt-i)
+ (x5 ( 1 — At) — oc6[ (Pt A -_i gt-1 — yt-1) — (v t-1 + dt-1 — Y t-i) — f( W" )
Yt-i
Q AK
t t 01 -- 13 2 /3t (Aq, — Apt )+13 3 B, (eq - ANA ) 04 Bt (AY, -z5)
Yt
— 5Bt(AYt-1 AA-1) 4- BtAkt-i — 136 (At ± BtAkt-i) -07 (v1-1 4. 64-1 yt-1
where the coefficients are given by the estimates in tables 3.1 and 3.2. The budget constraint
Pt Gt + Qt zliCt + + St
is
=1 	(4.3)
Net financial wealth is affected by changes in valuation.
Wt 1-tt(W,-1 + St)
	 (4.4)
14ft is net wealth corrected for valuation changes up till period t. li t is the correction factor in
period t, wich is equal to 1 when there are no valuation changes and zero real estate net
purchases so that St equals net financial investments AWt . Depreciation is assumed to be
proportional to the lagged capital stock.
Dt 	 (4.5)
where 6 1 is the rate of depreciation. Net interest income is part of disposable income, and
depends on net wealth and the average nominal interest rate.
(4.1)
(4.2)
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=X+1?,
R = Wt Wt-1 
"	 2
Disposable income exclusive of net interest income
Rt 	Net interest income
it	 Average nominal interest rate
The nominal interest rate depends on the real interest rate and the rate of inflation.
it = rt 1-12- (645t A-15t-i)
Here, some inertia from changes in inflation to the average nominal interest rate are imposed
on the model. Finally, the overall price index for local government expenditures is included
in the model.
PG +QAKt	 t	 t	 t 
Gt +1Ct
(4.9)
To make the model complete, we also have to substitute for At and Bt from (3.11) and (3.12),
for the definition in (3.14) and for the definitions yt = log Yt ,	 = log /), et cetera. Then, the
system contains nine endogenous variables:
G,,Ko Wt ,St ,Dt ,Yo Ro it ,i5t
And the exogenous variables are
(4.6)
(4.7)
(4.8)
Pt , g , vt,xt,Fort,l-tt
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In order to simulate shocks in exogenous variables, the first step is to create a post-sample
model simulated reference path. The initial values of the exogenous variables are set equal to
the observations in the last year of the sample, 1991, which is the starting point for the
simulations. For the subsequent years of the reference path, each exogenous variable is either
held constant, or it's growth rate is held constant. In the reference path, the exogenous prices
and the rate of depreciation are held constant at the 1991 level. The real interest rate is 5
percent, the net purchase of real estate in Oslo is zero, and the debt valuation change factor is
1 from 1992 and onwards. Exogenous nominal income, X„ is growing with a rate of 2
percent from 1991 and onwards.
As prices are constant in the reference path, the growth rates in real and nominal magnitudes
are equal. The trajectories of disposable income, consumption, real investment and net debt in
the reference path from 1991 to 2030 are shown in figure D.1. of Appendix D. The upward
trends in the endogenous variables are driven by the growth in exogenous income. All figures
in appendix D are in nominal terms.
A shock in exogenous income
In this simulation, exogenous income is increased permanently with 1 billion Norwegian
kroner in 1994, compared to the reference path. All other exogenous inputs are identical to
those of the reference path. The resultant dynamic absolute deviations from the reference
path in consumption, real investment and net debt are reproduced in figure D.2.
The model simulation implies that there is considerable sluggishness in the adjustment of
local government spending to increases in real income. In the year of impact and the
following year, this brings about relatively high budget surpluses, and a corresponding
reduction in the net debt. Later on, spending is increased sufficently so that lower budget
surpluses than in the reference path are incurred. Spending becomes so high that the increase
in net debt is overshooting its target. The high debt ratio thus incurred has a dampening effect
on consumption. At the end of the simulation period, the increase in consumption is at the
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lower side of 1 billion kroner, the increase in real investment is approaching zero, and the
increase in net debt is between zero and 1 billion kroner.
An inflationary shock
In this simulation, exogenous income and prices are increased permanently with 1 percent in
1994, as compared to the reference path. The corresponding increase in inflation is
temporary. The resultant dynamic percentage deviations from the reference path in
consumption, real investment and net debt are reproduced in figure D.3.
The simulation indicate that non-homogeneities are present in the model in the short run and
the medium run. Yet, the econometric equations are static homogenous of degree zero in
nominal magnitudes. The non-homogeneity could stem from the accounting relations,
especially equations (4.3) - (4.7). From (4.3), a 1 percent increase in nominal expenditures
and disposable income, implies that the increase in the budget surplus must be 1 percent,
assuming zero net purchases of real estate. But from (4.4), because the lagged debt level is
predetermined, it is exceptional if the percentage increase in net wealth equals the percentage
increase in the budget surplus. And when the net wealth is negative, the budget surplus has to
decrease in order to make the net debt increase with 1 percent. Again from (4.3), if the budget
surplus decreases, the nominal expenditures have to increase by more than 1 percent if
disposable income increases by 1 percent. Thus, nominal homogeneity in the short run is
unlikely to occur.
As a consequence of a temporary increase in the nominal interest rate induced by the jump in
prices, there is a significant increase in the interest payments in the short run. This entails that
the increase in disposable income is less than 1 percent in the year of impact and the
following year. Thus, there is scope for an increase in the budget deficit and the net debt in
the short run. However, the debt increase is less than 1 percent. After the lapse of two
periods, there seems to be a reaction to the preceding heavy budget deficits, manifested
notably in a downturn in net real investment relative to the reference path. Subsequently, real
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investment is overshooting a 1 percent increase relative to the reference path. In the long run,
all real magnitudes are unaffected by the inflationary shock.
A shock in the real interest rate
In this simulation, the real interest rate is increased permanantly with 1 percentage point in
1994, as compared to the reference path. The resultant dynamic percentage deviations from
the reference path in consumption, real investment and net debt are reproduced in figure D.4.
From equation (4.6) - (4.8), it appears that the shock is quite similar to a permanent reduction
in income. The similarity is confirmed by a comparison of figure D.4 and D.2. Besides, the
effect depends on the the level of net debt in the reference path.
5. Conclusion
The bargaining theory framework turn out to be conducive to empirical modelling of
aggregate local government spending behaviour. The preferred econometric equations are
fairly well-behaved, and have interesting interpretations. They indicate that the disagreement
points are combinations of the status quo allocation and long run relationships between
budget shares. The long run relationships serve to stabilize consumption, the real capital
stock and the net debt relative to disposable income. According to the empirical model, 45
percent of the budget slack in a given period is allocated to net real investment expenditures.
The exogeneity assumption for disposable income is not rejected by Hausman tests.
Model simulations show that the sluggishness in spending is considerable in the adjustment to
exogenous shocks. A positive shift in real income will in the short run lead to reductions in
the net debt, due to the sluggish spending adjustment. But as spending adjustments take
place, the effect on the net debt is reversed, so the long run effect is positive.
36
References
Alesina, A. (1988): "Macroeconomics and Politics". NBER Macroeconomics Annual II.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Barnett, R., R. Levaggi and P. Smith (1991): "An Incremental Budgeting Model of Local
Public Expenditure Setting in the Presence of Piecewise Linear Budget
Constraints". Applied Economics 23, 946-956.
Bennett, R. (1984): "A Bureaucratic Model of Local Government Tax and Expenditure
Decisions". Applied Economics 16, 257-268.
Binmore, K., A. Rubinstein and A. Wolinsky (1986): "The Nash Bargaining Solution in
Economic Modelling". Rand Journal of Economics 17, 176-188.
Bleivik, K.G. (1991): "TESTEST: An Interactive Programme to Test Econometric
Equations/Models". Oslo: Bank of Norway.
Borge, L.E. and J. Ratts0 (1993): "Dynamic Responses to Changing Demand: A Model of the
Reallocation Process in Small and Large Municipalities in Norway". Applied
Economics 25, 589-598.
Davis, O.A., M.A.H. Dempster and Aa. Wildavsky (1966): "A Theory of the Budgetary
Process". American Political Science Review 60, 347-396.
Dempster, M.A.H. and Aa. Wildavsky (1979): "On Change: Or, there is No Magic Size for an
Increment". Political Studies 32, 371-396.
Dunne, J.P„ P. Pashardes and R.P. Smith (1984): "Needs, Costs and Bureaucracy: The
Allocation of Public Consumption in the UK". Economic Journal 94, 1-15.
Engle, R.F. (1982): "Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the
Variance of United Kingdom Inflation". Econometrica 50, 987-1008.
Fischer, G.W. and M.S. Kamlet (1984): "Explaining Presidential Priorities: The Competing
Aspiration Levels Model of Macrobudgetary Decision Making". American Political
Science Review 72, 356-371.
Gilbert, C.L. (1986): "Professor Hendry's Econometric Methodology". Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics 48,3, 283-306.
37
Hagen, T.P. and R.J. Sorensen (1993): "Bargaining Strength in Budgetary Processes. The
Impact of Institutional Procedures". Oslo: Norwegian School of Management.
Harsanyi, J. (1977): Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social
Situations. Cambridge University Press.
Harvey, A.C. (1981): The Econometric Analysis of Time Series. Oxford: Philip Allan.
Hausman, J.A. (1978): "Specification Tests in Econometrics". Econometrica 46,6,1251-1271.
Hendry, D.F., A.R. Pagan and J.D. Sargan (1984): "Dynamic Specification". In Z. Griliches
and M.D. Intriligator (eds): Handbook of Econometrics Vol 2. Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
Holtz-Eakin, D., H.S. Rosen and S. Tilly (1993): "Intertemporal Analysis of State and Local
Government Spending: Theory and Tests". NBER Working Paper 4261.
Inman, R.P. (1989): "The Fiscal Performance of Local Governments: An Interpretative
Review". In P. Mieszkowski and M. Straszheim (eds): Current Issues in Urban
Economics. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
Jarque, C.M. and A.K. Bera (1980): "Efficient Tests for Normality, Homoscedasticity and
Serial Independence of Regression Residuals". Economic Letters 6, 255-259.
Leonard, H.B. (1986): Checks Unbalanced. New York: Basic Books.
Nash, J. (1950): "The Bargaining Problem". Econometrica 18, 155-162.
Niskanen, W. (1975): "Bureaucrats and Politicans". Journal of Law and Economics 18, 617-
643.
Pagan, A.R. (1987): "Three Econometric Methodologies: A Critical Appraisal". Journal of
Economic Surveys 1, 3-24.
Ramsey, J.B. (1969): "Tests for Specification Errors in Classical Linear Least-Squares
Regression Analysis". Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B31(2), 350-371.
Renaud, P.S.A. and F.A.A.M. Van Winden (1993): "Behavior and Budgetary Autonomy of
Local Governments. A Multi-Level Model Applied to the Netherlands". European
Journal of Political Economy 7, 547-577.
Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1979): "The Elusive Median Voter". Journal of Public
Economics 12, 143-170.
38
Roth, A. (1979): Axiomatic Models of Bargaining. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Rubin, I.S. (1990): The Politics of Public Budgeting. Getting and Spending, Borrowing and
Balancing. New Jersey: Chatham House.
Rubinfeld, D. (1987): "The Economics of the Local Public Sector". In A. Auerbach and M.
Feldstein (eds): Handbooks of Public Economics Vol 2. Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
Van Velthoven, B .C.J. (1989): The Endogenization of Government Behaviour in
Macroeconomic Models. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Van Winden, F.A.A.M. (1983): On the Interaction Between State and Private Sector.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Verbon, H.A.A. and F.A.A.M. Van Winden (eds) (1993): The Political Economy of
Government Debt. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Wildavsky, Aa. (1986): Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes. Oxford:
Transaction Books.
39
Appendix A. Variables and definitions
Yt	 Local government nominal disposable income. Comprises tax income plus net
transfers from the central government plus net interest income minus subsidies and
transfers to the private sector minus dividend payments in local government
enterprises. Fees and charges are not included.
Local government consumption in fixed prices. Equals current expenditures plus
depreciation minus fees and charges.
Kt
	Local government capital stock
AKt Local government net real investment in fixed prices
Dt 	Local government depreciation in fixed prices
ot 	Local government rate of depreciation
P	 Local government consumption price index
Q	 Local government net real investment price index
3 Price per unit of local government depreciation
Overall price index for local government expenditures. The index is a weighed
average of consumption and investment prices.
Vitt	 Local government net financial wealth
AWt Local government net financial investments
Ilt 	Correction factor for valuation changes in the net wealth and non-zero net purchases of
real estate
St
	Local government net financial investments plus net purchases of real estate (Oslo not
included)
Net purchases of real estate in Oslo
Rt	 Local government net interest income
it	 Average nominal interest rate on local government net debt. Computed as the
proportion of net interest payments to the average of current and lagged net debt.
Average real interest rate on local government net debt. Equals the nominal interest
rate minus the average of current and lagged inflation in the overall price index for
local government expenditures.
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Xt 	Local government disposable income exclusive net interest income
Appendix B. Test statistics
Standard error of regression
DW	 The Durbin Watson test for first order autocorrelation in the error term.
LM F(j,T-N-j)	 Lagrange multiplier test for j-th order autocorrelation in the error
term. Harvey (1981).
ARCH F(1,T-N-2) Test for first order autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in the
error term. Engle (1982).
NORM x(2) 	Test for normally distributed error term. Jarque and Bera (1980).
RESET F(2,T-N-2) Ramsey-test for tnisspecification. Ramsey (1969).
T is the number of sample observations, and N is the number of estimated parameters in the
equation.
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Appendix C. Recursive estimates
Figure
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Figure C.13. Recursive estimates - equation (3.16)
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Appendix D. Simulating shocks in exogenous variables
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